Is Filing Of A FIR Is A Condition Precedent To The Exercise Of The Power To Grant Anticipatory Bail Under Section 438 Of Criminal Procedure Code ? Detailed Discussion With Landmark Judgements



Anticipatory bail is granted under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code. According to it, “  Where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail;  “

Therefore, filing of a First Information Report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438. What Section 438 Cr.P.C. requires is that the applicant is apprehending his arrest on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence. It is not necessary that at the time of applying for anticipatory bail, the police must have already registered the FIR. Anticipatory bail can be applied even before registration of FIR, provided there is a real apprehension of arrest on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence.

In this regard it is relevant to point out that
In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Etc vs State Of Punjab  1980 AIR 1632, a constitutional bench of supreme Court held that   the filing of a First Information Report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438 . The imminence  of a likely arrest founded on a reasonable belief can be shown to exist even if an F.I.R. is not yet filed. Section 438 of the Code  lays down a condition which has to be  satisfied before  anticipatory bail can be granted. The  applicant must  show that he has "reason  to believe” that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence.

The use of the expression "reason to believe" shows that the belief that the applicant may be so arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere  'fear' is not  'belief', for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort  of a vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against  him, in pursuance of which he may be arrested. The grounds on which the belief of the applicant  is based  that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence,  must be  capable of being examined by the court objectively, because it is then alone that the court can determine  whether the  applicant has  reason to believe that he may be so  arrested, therefore, Section 438(1) cannot be invoked on the basis  and  general allegations, as if to arm oneself  in perpetuity against a possible arrest. 

In K. Rajasekhara Reddy vs State Of A.P.  1998 (4) ALD 677, it was held  that filing of an FIR and registration of a crime by the Police is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. Jurisdiction of the Court can be invoked by any person even in the absence of registration of a crime and there is no requirement of furnishing the crime number as such. There is also no requirement that a copy of the F.I.R. should be made available for the purpose of considering the application under Section 438 of Cr.P.C.

But it Does not  mean that an applicant is entitled for the relief under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. on the basis of mere apprehension. The belief entertained by an applicant that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence must be capable of examining by the Court objectively. There must be clear and definite material before the Court to examine the basis on which the applicant entertained such apprehension. A person invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. is duty bound to make available such material to the Court to enable the Court to examine that material objectively and to discern as to whether the apprehension entertained by such person is a reasonable one or not. "a belief can be said to be founded on reasonable ground only if there is something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicant's apprehension that he may be arrested is genuine." In the absence of such material, the Court cannot issue necessary directions to release the applicant in the event of his arrest, as the Court would not be in a position to specify as to in what connection and in respect of what accusation the applicant is required to be released. The Court is bound to indicate as against what accusation a person is required to be released by the Police in the event of arrest. In the absence of tangible material, any direction to release an applicant under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. would amount to grant of a blanket order of anticipatory bail.

In K. Dayanand Rao And Ors. vs State Of A.P. 1992 (3) ALT 21 it was held that "Section 438 Cr.P.C. does not contain a condition that unless the crime number is mentioned or the FIR is filed no application thereunder would lie. Therefore reading into the Section such a condition not imposed by the Statute. Mentioning of crime number in the application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is not a pre-requisite for its maintainability.”

In Thayyanbadi Meethal Kunhiraman vs S.I. Of Police 1985 CriLJ 1111 the Kerala High Court observed that:

"In order to invoke the provision, it is not necessary that a case has already been registered or even a first information has been lodged."

Similar is the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Re: Digendra Sarkar and others, 1982 Crl.LJ. 2197. The Calcutta High Court observed:

"The filing of an FIR is not a condition precedent to the application for anticipatory bail and in such case, the person having reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of non-bailable offence may appear before the High Court or the Court of Session, not for the purpose of being taken into custody of the Court but for getting an order for his release in case he is arrested."

Thus the filing of first information report is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power under section 438 Cr. P.C. But the imminence of a likely arrest founded on a reasonable belief can be shown to exist even if an FIR is not yet filed.

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Interim Maintenance Of Qualified Wife Under Section 24 Of The Hindu Marriage Act- Detailed Discussion With Landmark Judgments

Interim Maintenance Of Qualified Wife Under Section 24 Of The Hindu Marriage Act- Detailed Discussion With Landmark Judgments


A wife is entitled to get pendente lite alimony from the husband in view of provisions of Section 24 of the Act if she happens to be a person who has no independent income sufficient for her to support and to make necessary expenses of the proceedings. 


The object behind Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is to provide for maintenance, pendente-lite, to a spouse in matrimonial proceedings so that during the pendency of the proceedings the spouse can maintain herself/himself and also have sufficient funds to carry on the litigation so that the spouse does not unduly suffer in the conduct of the case for want of funds. 


A spouse unable to maintain himself/herself is entitled to maintenance on the principle of equi-status and respect that the spouse would have enjoyed if he/she continued to live with other spouse. 

The provisions of Section 24 are beneficent in nature and the power is exercised by the Court not only out of compassion but also by way of judicial duty so that the indigent spouse may not suffer at the instance of the affluent spouse.

Therefore, the question arises is whether a woman having good qualifications and sufficient income is entitled to claim pendente lite alimony from her husband in a matrimonial petition which has been filed against her for divorce on the ground of cruelty. 


The question also here is Whether a spouse who has capacity of earning but chooses to remain idle, should be permitted to saddle other spouse with his or her expenditure ? and Whether such spouse should be permitted to get pendente lite alimony at higher rate from other spouse in such condition ? 


These questions were considered in detail in 


Smt. Mamta Jaiswal vs Rajesh Jaiswal  II (2000) DMC 170,  where the petitioner Mamta Jaiswal has acquired qualification as MSc. M.C. M.Ed, and was working in Gulamnabi Azad. College of Education, Pusad, Distt. Yeotmal (MHS). The husband Rajesh Jaiswal is sub-engineer serving in Pimampur factory. The order which is under challenge by itself shows that Mamta Jaiswal, the wife was earning Rs. 4,000/- as salary when she was in service in the year 1994. The husband Rajesh Jaiswal is getting salary of Rs. 5,852/-. 


The Matrimonial Court awarded alimony of Rs. 800/- to Mamta Jaiswal per month as pendente lite alimony, Rs. 400/- per month has been awarded to their daughter Ku, Diksha Jaiswal. Expenses necessary for litigation has been awarded to the tune of Rs. 1,500/-. The Matrimonial Court has directed Rajesh Jaiswal to pay travelling expenses to Mamta Jaiswal whenever she attends Court for hearing of them matrimonial petition pending between them. 



Matrimonial petition has been filed by husband Rajesh Jaiswal for getting divorce from Mamta Jaiswal on the ground of cruelty. This revision petition arises on account of rejection of the prayer made by Mamta Jaiswal when she prayed that she be awarded the travelling expenses of one adult attendant who is to come with her for attending Matrimonial Court. 



And the Court answered the above questions thus 


" Section 24 has been enacted for the purpose of providing a monetary assistance to such spouse who is incapable of supporting himself Or herself in spite of sincere efforts made by him or herself. 


A spouse who is well qualified to get the service immediately with less efforts is not expected to remain idle to squeeze out, to milk out the other spouse by relieving him of his or her own purse by a cut in the nature of pendente lite alimony. The law does not expect the increasing number of such idle persons who by remaining in the arena of legal battles, try to squeeze out the adversary by implementing the provisions of law suitable to their purpose.



In the present case Mamta Jaiswal is a well qualified woman possessing qualification like M.Sc. M.C. M.Ed. Till 1994 she was serving in Gulamnabi Azad Education College. It impliedly means that she was possessing sufficient experience. How such a lady can remain without service ? It really puts a bug question which is to be answered by Mamta Jaiswal with sufficient cogent and believable evidence by proving that in spite of sufficient efforts made by her, she was not able to get service and, therefore, she is unable to support herself. 


A lady who is fighting matrimonial petition filed for divorce, cannot be permitted to sit idle and to put her burden on the husband for demanding pendente lite alimony from him during pendency of such matrimonial petition.


Section 24 is not meant for creating an army of such idle persons who would be sitting idle waiting for a 'dole' to be awarded by her husband who has got a grievance against her and who has gone to the Court for seeking a relief against her. The case may be vice versa also. If a husband well qualified, sufficient enough to earn, site idle and puts his burden on the wife and waits for a 'dole' to be awarded by remaining entangled in litigation. That is also not permissible. The law does not help indolent as well idles so also does not want an army of self made lazy idles. 


Everyone has to earn for the purpose of maintenance of himself or herself, at least, has to make sincere efforts in that direction
. If this criteria is not applied, if this attitude is not adopted, there would be a tendency growing amongst such litigants to prolong such litigation and to milk out the adversary who happens to be a spouse, once dear but far away after an emerging of litigation. 





If such army is permitted to remain in existence, there would be no sincere efforts of amicable settlements because the lazy spouse would be very happy to fight and frustrate the efforts of amicable settlement because he would be reaping the money in the nature of pendente lite alimony, and would prefer to be happy in remaining idle and not bothering himself or herself for any activity to support and maintain himself or herself .


That cannot be treated to be aim, goal of Section 24. It is indirectly against healthiness of the society. It has enacted for needy persons who in spite of sincere efforts and sufficient effort are unable to support and maintain themselves and are required to fight out the litigation jeopardizing their hard earned income by toiling working hours


The Court held that  


"  In the present case the husband has not challenged the order of alimony pendente lite therefore, no variation or modification was made in the order. This revision petition arises on account of rejection of the prayer made by Mamta Jaiswal when she prayed that she be awarded the travelling expenses of one adult attendant who is to come with her for attending Matrimonial Court such revision petition stands dismissed"




Here are some of the judgments where interim maintenance to a qualified wife was altogether denied or reduced.



In Rupali Gupta Vs Rajat Gupta MAT.APP.(F.C.) 143/2014 The wife had petitioned against the Family Court’s verdict denying interim maintenance to her considering her qualifications and supposed financial independence, given her 13 years of experience as a Chartered Accountant. An amount of 22,900 per month towards the maintenance to her two children was, however, awarded by the court. 


The couple got married on July 16, 2005, in Delhi, had two children and lived together till 2013. The woman is a CA while her husband is an Electrical Engineer but runs his own business. 


After the filing of divorce petition by the husband, the wife filed an application seeking interim maintenance for a sum of 
3 lakh per month for herself and the two children, and 1.1 lakh towards litigation expenses. 


The family court had struck down the demand and also observed that the parties were indulging in jugglery of accounts to present a misleading picture of their financial status. The petitioner’s claim that she was earning only 
7000 per month was put down by the court on  on the basis of illogicality of the claim. 



The appellate Court observed that


" Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act makes a provision for award of interim maintenance to a spouse who has no independent income sufficient to support herself and fight the legal battle. "


The court held that "the decision taken by the Family Court was a balanced one and did not call for any interference. The impugned judgment was thus upheld."


In Manokaran @ Ramamoorthy Vs. M. Devaki, AIR 2003 Mad 212 the High Court of Madras while construing the provision of Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act and relying on its earlier decision reported as Kumaresan Vs.Aswathi held that for grant of maintenance, the party should not have sufficient independent income for her/his support. 

The Court therefore observed and held that 

" In the light of the materials available it is established that the petitioner/husband herein is getting only Rs.70/- per day or Rs.2000/- per month. On the other hand it is the admitted case of the respondent/wife that she is employed in a private Satelite T.V. drawing a salary of Rs.4,500/-and earning for her livelihood staying with her brother, therefore it cannot be construed that she is not having sufficient independent income." 

" The Family Court lost its sight to consider the above material aspect and therefore the impugned order of the Principal Family Court granting interim maintenance at the rate of Rs.750/- per month and litigation expenses of Rs.1,500/-, is set aside and the Civil Revision Petition is allowed."


In Manish Kumar vs Pratibha (2009) ILR 2 Delhi 246 The Delhi High Court while dealing with a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioner/husband against an order passed by the trial court granting a interim maintenance of Rs.7,500/- per month to the respondent wife under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA) observed that - 

" The benefits granted under this Section are only temporary in nature and there are other provisions of law where a wife, who is not able to maintain herself, can
claim maintenance/permanent alimony from the husband e.g. Section 25 of HMA or under provisions of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act."

" The provisions of this Section are not meant for equivalising the income of wife with that of husband but are meant to see that where divorce or other proceedings are filed, either of the party should not suffer because of paucity of source of income and the Court should pass an order even during the pendency of such a petition, for maintenance and litigation expenses."

" Where a wife has no income or is without any support for maintaining herself, the Court has to pass an order considering the income and living status of the husband. However, where the wife and her husband both are earning and both are having good salary, merely because there is some salary difference, an order is not required to be passed under Section 24 of HMA."

In this case the court finds that

" The salary slips of the wife has been placed on record which show that she was having salary in the range of around Rs.50,000/- per month. Her statement of salary account from February 2007 to January 2008 shows that she had a take-home salary during this year of Rs.6,80,188/-. The average monthly salary was thus Rs.56,682/-"

And therefore held that

" A person who is earning this much of salary can very well maintain herself with such a standard which may be envy of many and under no stretch of imagination it can be said that the income earned by her was not enough to maintain her. There was no other liability on her. There is no offspring from this wedlock."

"  The trial court has wrongly allowed maintenance to the respondent wife and therefore the impugned order granting maintenance of Rs.7500/- per month to the wife, is hereby set aside. However, the petitioner would be liable to pay the litigation expenses, as ordered by the trial court."




In Anirudha Mishra vs Dr. Sujata Acharya AIR 2004 Ori 1 The Orissa High Court while dealing with a petition filed by the petitioner/husband against an order passed by the trial court granting a interim maintenance of Rs.800/- per month and litigation expenses of Rs. 3,000/-, to the opposite party - wife under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA) observed that -

" The opposite party is working as a teacher in St. Xavior School. and is drawing salary of Rs 3240/- every month. However, on the other hand it also appears that the present petitioner is working as a News Reporter in O.T.V., Bhubaneswar and is drawing a salary of Rs. 3496/- per month. If comparison is made so far as salaries of the respective parties are concerned, it appears that the petitioner is earning a little more than that of the opposite party. The expenditure incurred by both the parties include treatment of their respective parents. The mother of the opposite party is getting family pension whereas the mother of the present petitioner is yet to get family pension and she is also suffering from cancer.”

" Thus the opposite party stands on much better footing than that of the present petitioner and since she is earning Rs. 3240/- every month towards salary from the school where she is working, it cannot be said that she is not in a position to maintain herself. We are, therefore, of the view that there was no reason for the revisional Court to allow interim maintenance of Rs. 800/- per month. So far as litigation expenses are concerned, we are of the view that there is no reason for us to interfere with the same.”



In Anu Kaul vs Rajeev Kaul CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1789-1790 OF 2009 the Supreme Court finds that

" The Respondent-husband is working as a Senior Head of Mukund Steel Ltd., having its head office at Mumbai and drawing a salary of Rs.40,000/- per month and is entitled to claim perks for the education of his children was not denied by the respondent by filing his counter affidavit or reply statement."

" In the application filed, the appellant admits that she is employed and drawing a salary of Rs.9,000/- per month. However, she asserts, she has to pay an amount of Rs.3,000/- by way of rent to the tenanted premises which she is presently occupying in view of the lis between the parties."


The Court held that " since the appellant is employed and is drawing a salary of Rs.9,000/- per month, we do not intend to enhance the litigation expenses awarded by the High Court during the pendency of the appeal filed by the husband " but no interim maintenance was given. 



But there are many Judgments where though the wife was a qualified one was awarded with maintenance like -


In Smt. Chandana Guha Roy vs Goutam Guha Roy AIR 2004 Cal 36, The wife-petitioner filed an application under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act praying for maintenance pendente lite with litigation cost. After that the husband-respondent also filed an application claiming maintenance from the wife. The trial court rejected both the applications on the ground that petitioner-wife is a graduate whereas the O.P.-husband, though a diploma Engineer, has been living a life of vagabond and is totally dependent upon the brothers. Then, on aggrieved by this order the filed an revisional application before the Calcutta High Court. 

The Calcutta High Court observed that


" The learned Trial Judge was wrong in the calculation that if an Arts Graduate lady can do something and should not sit idle then the learned Trial Judge also should have considered that the petitioner-husband is a Diploma Engineer and he also should not sit idle being able-bodied."


" It cannot be said to be believable that in a private firm named Garrison Engineering Company which is a reputed organization has appointed the O.P.-husband as store-in-charge without appointment letter and has also terminated his job without any letter of termination, far less without any disciplinary proceeding or without any enquiry It is also surprising that the learned trial Judge accepted that the service of the O.P.-husband in these hard days was terminated and he did not proceed with any legal proceeding challenging the order of dismissal from service. "

The Court held that


" The impugned order passed by the Trial Court is therefore, set aside. The learned Trial Judge is directed to hear the application afresh filed by both the wife and the husband. Till the learned trial Judge arrives at a decision the court direct the respondent/husband to pay Rs. 1800/-(Rupees One thousand eight hundred only) per month as maintenance to the petitioner/ wife and will go on paying the same month by month by sending the same to the petitioner/wife through Money Order. The respondent-husband is also directed to pay Rs. 5000/- (Rupees Five thousand) only in two equal installments within three months from date to the petitioner/wife towards litigation costs. "

Thus the position is that a qualified wife may entitled to get interim maintenance provided she has no independent income sufficient for her support.  



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Under What Circumstances More Than Three Adjournments May Be Given By The Court? Legal Provision of Adjournment Under CPC (Order 17) - Detailed Discussion With Landmark Judgements

Under What Circumstances More Than Three Adjournments May Be Given By The Court? Legal Provision of Adjournment Under CPC (Order 17) - Detailed Discussion With Landmark Judgements


Adjournments frequently sought by the parties contribute significantly to the delays caused in deciding the matters. The granting of adjournments is at the discretion of the court. The rules governing adjournments are considerably strict and if applied in their true spirit can substantially reduce the delays involved.

Order 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the provision of adjournment. It runs as under :-


1. Court may grant time and adjourn hearing- (1) The Court may, if sufficient cause is shown, at any stage of the suit grant time to the parties or to any of them, and may from time to time adjourn the hearing of the suit for reasons to be recorded in writing.

Provided that no such adjournment shall be granted more than three times to a party during hearing of the suit.
(2) Costs of adjournment- In every such case the Court shall fix a day for the further hearing of the suit and shall make such orders , as to costs occasioned by the adjournment or such higher cost as the court deems fit

Provided that,-

(a) When the hearing of the suit has commenced, it shall be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds that, for the exceptional reasons to be recorded by it, the adjournment of the hearing beyond the following day is necessary.

(b) no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party, except where the circumstances are beyond the control of that party.


(c) the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in another Court, shall not be a ground for adjournment.


(d) where the illness of a pleader or his inability to conduct the case for any reason, other than his being engaged in another Court, is put forward as a ground for adjournment, the Court shall not grant the adjournment unless it is satisfied that the party applying for adjournment could not have engaged another pleader in time.


(e) where a witness is present in Court but a party or his pleader is not present or the party or his pleader, though present in Court, is not ready to examine or cross-examine the witness, the Court may, if it thinks fit,record the statement of the witness and pass such orders as it thinks fit dispensing with the examination-in-chief or cross-examination of the witness, as the case may be, by the party or his pleader not present or not ready as aforesaid.


2 . Procedure if parties fail to appear on day fixed,- Where, on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the parties or any of them fail to appear, the Court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by Order IX or make such other order as it thinks fit.

Explanation.- Where the evidence or a substantial portion of the evidence of any party has already been recorded and such party fails to appear on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the Court may, in its discretion, proceed with the case as if such party were present.

3 . Court may proceed notwithstanding either party fails to produce evidence, etc.— Where any party to a suit to whom time has been granted fails to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his

witnesses, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, for which time has been allowed, the Court may, notwithstanding such default,-
(a) if the parties are present, proceed to decide the suit forthwith, or
(b) if the parties are, or any of them is, absent, proceed under rule 2

In Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India - AIR 2005 SC 3353, the Supreme Court commented upon these amendments in Order 17 Code of Civil Procedure in the following words:


" 29. Order XVII of the Code relates to grant of adjournments. Two amendments have been made therein. One that adjournment shall not be granted to a party more than three times during hearing of the suit. The other relates to cost of adjournment.

The awarding of cost has been made mandatory. Costs that can be awarded are of two types. First, cost occasioned by the adjournment and second such higher cost as the court deems fit.

30. While examining the scope of proviso to Order XVII Rule 1 that more than three adjournments shall not be granted, it is to be kept in view that proviso to Order XVII Rule 2 incorporating Clauses (a) to (e) by Act 104 of 1976 has been retained. Clause (b) stipulates that no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party, except where the circumstances are beyond the control of that party.

The proviso to Order XVII Rule 1 and Order XVII Rule 2 have to be read together. So read, Order XVII does not forbid grant of adjournment where the circumstances are beyond the control of the party. In such a case, there is no restriction on number of adjournments to be granted. It cannot be said that even if the circumstances are beyond the control of a party, after having obtained third adjournment, no further adjournment would be granted.

There may be cases beyond the control of a party despite the party having obtained three adjournments. For instance, a party may be suddenly hospitalized on account of some serious ailment or there may be serious accident or some act of God leading to devastation. It cannot be said that though circumstances may be beyond the control of a party, further adjournment cannot be granted because of restriction of three adjournments as provided in proviso to Order XVII Rule 1.

31. In some extreme cases, it may become necessary to grant adjournment despite the fact that three adjournments have already been granted (Take the example of Bhopal Gas Tragedy, Gujarat earthquake and riots, devastation on account of Tsunami).

Ultimately, it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, on the basis whereof the Court would decide to grant or refuse adjournment. The provision for costs and higher costs has been made because of practice having been developed to award only a nominal cost even when adjournment on payment of costs is granted. Ordinarily, where the costs or higher costs are awarded, the same should be realistic and as far as possible actual cost that had to be incurred by the other party shall be awarded where the adjournment is found to be avoidable but is being granted on account of either negligence or casual approach of a party or is being sought to delay the progress of the case or on any such reason.

Further, to save proviso to Order XVII Rule 1 from the vice of article 14 of the Constitution of India, it is necessary to read it down so as not to take away the discretion of the Court in the extreme hard cases noted above. The limitation of three adjournments would not apply where adjournment is to foe granted on account of circumstances which are beyond the control of a party. Even in cases which may not strictly come within the category of circumstances beyond the control of a party, the Court by resorting to the provision of higher cost which can also include punitive cost in the discretion of the Court, adjournment beyond three can be granted having regard to the injustice that may result on refusal thereof, with reference to peculiar facts of a case.

We may, however, add that grant of any adjournment let alone first, second or third adjournment is not a right of a party.
The grant of adjournment by a court has to be on a party showing special and extraordinary circumstances. It cannot be in routine. While considering prayer for grant of adjournment, it is necessary to keep in mind the legislative intent to restrict grant of adjournments."

In M/s. Shiv Cotex vs Tirgun Auto Plast P. Limited and others  2011(4) RCR(Civil) 807 the Supreme Court ruled as follows for courts to emulate and to exercise discretionary jurisdiction in the following manner in the matter of granting adjournments:-

"16. No litigant has a right to abuse the procedure provided in the CPC. Adjournments have grown like cancer corroding the entire body of justice delivery system. It is true that cap on adjournments to a party during the hearing of the suit provided in proviso to Order XVII Rule 1 CPC is not mandatory and in a suitable case, on justifiable cause, the court may grant more than three adjournments to a party for its evidence but ordinarily the cap provided in the proviso to Order XVII Rule 1 CPC should be maintained.

When we say `justifiable cause' what we mean to say is, a cause which is not only `sufficient cause' as contemplated in sub-rule (1) of Order XVII CPC but a cause which makes the request for adjournment by a party during the hearing of the suit beyond three adjournments unavoidable and sort of a compelling necessity like sudden illness of the litigant or the witness or the lawyer; death in the family of any one of them; natural calamity like floods, earthquake, etc

The list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the absence of the lawyer or his non-availability because of professional work in other court or elsewhere or on the ground of strike call or the change of a lawyer or the continuous illness of the lawyer (the party whom he represents must then make alternative arrangement well in advance) or similar grounds will not justify more than three adjournments to a party during the hearing of the suit.

In Bharat Rajput vs. Amrik Singh Aulakh and others (C.R.No.1556 of 2014) it was observed that : 
 There is nothing like 'last opportunity' in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or last opportunity given many times over or last final opportunity, ultimate opportunity and penultimate opportunity. This is endless compassion. Therefore, there is greater need for the trial judge to consciously and carefully weigh all attending circumstances in a given case to secure the ends of justice before the first such order is issued. 

In Joginder Singh and Ors. v. Smt. Manjit Kaur Civil Revision No 5885 of 1998, it was held that 
The cumulative effect of the provisions of Order 18 Rule 2 read with Rules 1 and 2 of Order 17 of Code of Civil Procedure and inherent powers of the Civil Court vested in it under Section 151 of the Code, placed an implied obligation on the Court not to adjourn the case unless sufficient cause was shown. The cause by itself cannot always be treated as a ground for repeated adjournments. Un-necessary and avoidable adjournments must be denied by the Courts. On the one hand, trial Courts are expected to dispose of suits and other proceedings expeditiously, and on the other, if parties to a lis are permitted to get the suits adjourned on the mere asking and that too for the indefinite times, it would frustrate the very spirit behind the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Case Instances 

1. In Raj Kumar vs Ramesh Kumar And Others CR No.2071 of 2014 HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
A revision petition is directed against the order dated 11.02.2014 whereby evidence of defendant-petitioner has been closed by order of the trial judge. The prayer is for revising the impugned order and for leave to produce witnesses in defense of the suit.

The Court finds that 
" It appears from the record that the plaintiff-respondent No.1 instituted a suit for partition of suit property against the respondents- defendants. After the plaintiff let in and closed his evidence, the defendant-petitioner had availed several opportunities to lead his evidence. On 26.09.2013, no defence witness was in attendance and the case was adjourned to 16.10.2013 for defence evidence subject to last opportunity for the purpose. On 16.10.2013, the defendant failed to produce his witnesses and the case was again adjourned to 07.01.2014 subject to last opportunity which was also rendered futile by non- production. On 11.02.2014, the court was left with no option but to close the evidence by order. The court came to the conclusion that petitioner- defendant had availed six effective opportunities including two last opportunities for leading his evidence but had failed to conclude his evidence. "
And held that 
" I find no infirmity with the orders passed by the court below. There is no scope left for interference or indulgence in revisional jurisdiction."

2. In Chander Singh vs Chottulal AIR 1994 Raj 186,
A revision petition has been filed against the order of the Additional Munsif No. 2, Jodhpur dated November 9, 1993 by which he has closed the evidence of the defendant-petitioner and has fixed the case for final arguments 

In the present case the plaintiff-non-petitioner has filed a suit for recovery of possession of the disputed premises against the defendant petitioner. On February 15, 1992, the plaintiff closed his evidence and April 9, 1992 was fixed for the evidence of the defendant. Thereafter, several dates were fixed for the same purpose. On November 9, 1993, the impugned order was passed.

The Court finds that

The plaintiff closed his evidence on February 15, 1992, keeping his right to produce evidence in rebuttal and April 9, 1992 was fixed for defendant's evidence. Thereafter, (1) 29-5-1992, (2) 27-8-1992. (3) 4-9-1992, (4) 18-9-1992, (5) 7-10-1992, (6)10-12-1992, (7) 21-1-1993, (8) 23-3-1993, (9) 14-4-1993, (10) 14-5-1993, (11) 31-5-1993, (12) 19-7-1993, (13) 3-8-1993, (14) 1-9-1993, (15) 7-9-1993, (16) 27-9-1993, (17) 14-10-1993, (18) 25-10-1993, and (19) 9-11-1993 were fixed for defendant's evidence, in between these dates, several other dates were also fixed for disposal of application moved by the defendant-petitioner under Order 13, Rule 2 and Order 6 Rule 17, C.P.C. He was also granted time to bring stay order from the Court in revisions to be filed against the orders passed on the said applications. It is clear from the order-sheet of the case that the learned trial court repeatedly adjourned the case in utter disregard of the provisions of Order 17, Rule 1, C.P.C
And held that 
Such liberal attitude of the trial courts is mainly responsible for the huge arrears of cases and inordinate delay in their disposal. The learned trial court should have closed the defendant’s evidence much earlier
Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed with costs.

 3. In Shiv Nath & another Vs. Bangai Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 28252 of 2006

The plaintiffs-petitioners' application for adjournment was rejected by the trial court vide on the ground that earlier on three occasions plaintiff's such prayer of adjournment had been granted and in the light of proviso added to Order 17 Rule 1 C.P.C. no adjournment beyond three dates could be granted by the court. The petitioners subsequently moved the trial court with another application under Section 151 C.P.C. for permitting Ram Raj, one of the the plaintiffs present in the court, to be cross examined by the defendant's counsel. But that application too has been dismissed by the trial court . Thereafter, only the petitioner approached the revisional court which also did not find favour of the court and has been dismissed. Then he filled the present writ petition. 

The Court finds that

The petitioners on 30.3.2005, which was the 4th date fixed for final hearing (evidence) in the suit, had moved an application for adjournment. The ground taken by the petitioner for adjournment was that the plaintiff P.W. 1 had fallen ill and could not reach the court to be present for his cross examination as such. His examination in chief had already been recorded earlier. The ground of illness, which had been taken for such adjournment, was though quite substantial but the gravity of the same has been out-weighed by the trial court simply keeping in view the referred proviso to Rule 1 of Order 17 C.P.C. Subsequent thereto the very next day (31.3.2005) when the plaintiff Ram Raj (P.W. 1) appeared before the court and moved an application under Section 151 C.P.C. offering himself for the cross examination, that prayer has also been dismissed by the trial court. 

The Court observed that

A perusal of the provisions of Order XVII no doubt makes it clear that the statute provides guidelines not to grant adjournment sought by one party in the matter of hearing of a suit on more than three occasions. But at the same time it also does not put complete fetters on the court's discretion for such grant of adjournment, in case, the party suffering on account of such grant of adjournment can be compensated by award of costs and there are exceptional reasons or circumstances beyond the control of that party seeking adjournment to proceed with the hearing.

In view of the availability of an exceptional circumstance, which was beyond control of the other plaintiff to produce P.W. 1 (the other plaintiff) in the witness box on 30.3.2005, the prayer seeking adjournment made by the petitioners should have been granted subject to award of costs

And the Court held that 

this writ petition is hereby disposed of with a direction to the trial court to permit cross examination of P.W. 1 Ram Raj on the very next date when the suit is listed for hearing and thereafter to further proceed to dispose of the case in accordance with law.

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