Divorce Papers - What Are The Contents Of A Petition For Contested Divorce?

Divorce Papers - What Are The Contents Of A Petition For Contested Divorce?



 There are various laws relating to Marriage and Divorce In India -

1. For Hindus, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

2. For Christians, the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 and the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872

3. For Muslims, the Dissolution of Marriage Act, 1939 and the Muslim Women(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986

4. For Parsis, the Parsi Marriage & Divorce Act, 1936.

5. The Special Marriage Act, 1954



Contested Divorce - A contested divorce is filed when one of the spouses decide to divorce the other without his/her consent.

In India a contested divorce can be filled on the basis of the following grounds namely -
1. Cruelty
2. Adultery
3. Desertion
4. Leprosy
5. Venereal disease
6. Mental disorder
7. Acceptance of religious order on renouncing the world
8. Respondent not heard of being alive for seven years.
9. Conversion to some other religion
10. Sentence of imprisonment for seven years
11. No resumption of cohabitation. etc.,


A divorce starts with a divorce petition. The petition is written by one spouse (the petitioner) and served on the other spouse. The petition is then filed in a district court 

Contents of the petition for Contested Divorce (Divorce papers) :-

Section 20 of the Hindu Marriage Act requires that every petition for divorce shall state as distinctly as possible the facts on which Petitioner's claim for relief is grounded. Such petitions are required to be verified by the Petitioner or by some other person competent to do it as required in C.P.C. and such petitions can be referred to as evidence.

Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act lays down that every petition for divorce shall state facts as distinctly as possible on which rests Petitioner's claim for reliefs sought. Section 47, Indian Divorce Act lays down the same rules as to verification and probative force of the petition as section 20, Hindu Marriage Act does. Similar provisions have been enacted by Section 32, Special Marriage Act.

Thus all petitions for contested divorce in India shall state:

1. The place and date of marriage.

2. Whether the petitioner and the respondent were Hindu by religion at the time of marriage and whether they continue to be so up to the date of filing of the petition. ''. This clause is not necessary in case of  Divorce Petition filed under special marriage act.

3. The name, status and domicile of the husband and wife before the marriage and at the time of filing of the petition.



4.The address where parties to the marriage reside at the time of the
presentation of the petition and last resided together,

5. The names of children, if any, of the marriage, their sex and their dates of birth or ages;

6. If prior to the date of the petition, there has been any proceeding under the Act between the parties to the petition, foil particulars thereof;

7. The matrimonial offence or offences alleged or other grounds, upon which the relief is sought, setting out with sufficient particularity the time and places of the acts alleged and other facts by which they are intended to be proved, for example, 

a. In every petition for divorce by either the husband or the wife on the ground that the other party has after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse, the petitioner shall state the name, occupation and place of residence of such person or persons so far as they can be ascertained, the specific acts of sexual intercourse and the occasion when and the where such acts were committed.

b. In the case of alleged desertion, the date and the circumstances in which it began; in the case of cruelty, the specific acts of cruelty and the occasion when and the place where such acts were committed.

c. In the case of unsoundness of mind or mental disorder, the time when such unsoundness of mind or mental disorder began to manifest itself and the nature and the period of the curative steps taken.

d. In the case of virulent and incurable form of leprosy or venereal disease in communicable form, when such ailment began to manifest and the nature and the period of the curative steps taken.

e. If the petition is on the ground that the respondent has renounced the world by entering any religious order, the date of
renunciation and the particulars of the religious order which the respondent has entered into

f. If the petition is on the ground that the respondent has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more, the date and the place the respondent was last seen or heard of alive and the steps, if any, taken to ascertain his or her whereabouts;

g. When the petition is found on the ground of rape or sodomy, the occasion when, the place where and the names and addresses of persons with whom such acts were committed. In case of conviction for committing rape or sodomy, the particulars thereof

h. Where the petition is founded on the ground of bestiality, the occasion when, the place where and the particulars of the beast with whom the husband had been guilty of bestiality



Affidavit of non-collusion :-

Every petition (excepting petitions for void marriage) should be accompanied by an affidavit to the effect that it is not presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent. In the petition seeking judicial separation/divorce on the ground that the party has, after the solemnization of the marriage had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse, it will also state that petitioner has not, in any manner, been accessory to or connived at the acts complained of.

Connivance arises when a party to marriage, being willing that a matrimonial offence should be committed by the other party, manifests that willingness by action or inaction with a corrupt intention or expectation that a matrimonial offence may follow.

According to Rayden

“Connivance implies an anticipatory consent to adultery committed by the other spouse. It may be active or passive acquiescence in or toleration of the adultery; but mere negligence, inattention or over-confidence, not amounting to intentional concurrence and consent, are not connivance. Where, however, a spouse bonafide and reasonably believes that the other is committing adultery,and,in order to get proof, follows or observes and does not interfere while adultery is being committed, such following or observation and non-interference does not amount to connivance. Connivance at adultery with one person may preclude relief in respect of adultery with another.”

Thus, if a person promotes and encourages the adultery of the other spouse, he cannot come to the court saying that it is the case of adultery and thus, cruelty is being committed.

Apart from it, it is also necessary, that the person should not be
accessory to the fact. The word ‘accessory’ is intended to mean aiding to produce or contribute to the bringing about of the offence complained against.

Thus, where the ground of the petition is that “the other party has after the solemnization of the marriage sexual intercourse with any person other than his spouse or that ‘the other party is living in adultery”, the court will satisfy itself that the petitioner has not in any manner been accessory to or connived at or condoned the act or acts complained of in the petition.



Affidavit of non- condonation:-

Where the ground for petition is voluntary sexual intercourse of the respondent with any person other than his or her spouse or where the ground for petition is cruelty, the petition shall be accompanied by an affidavit to the effect that the petitioner has not condoned the act or acts complained of or has not in any manner condoned the cruelty.

Condonation: The doctrine of condonation was established by the old Ecclesiastical Courts in Great Britain and was adopted by the English Courts from the Common Law. It came to India through English Courts.

“Condonation” means forgiveness of the matrimonial offence and the restoration of offending spouse to the same position as he or she occupied before the offence was committed. To constitute condonation there must be, therefore, two things, forgiveness and restoration.

Condonation is always subject to the implied condition that the offending spouse will not commit a fresh matrimonial offence, either of the same variety as the one condoned or of any other variety. ‘No matrimonial offence is erased by condonation. It is obscured but not obliterated’. Since the condition of forgiveness
is that no further matrimonial offence shall occur, it is not necessary that the fresh offence should be ‘ejusdem generis’ with the original offence. Condoned cruelty can, therefore, be revived, say by desertion or adultery.

So, these are the contents of a petition for contested divorce. 
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Consequences Of Disobedience Of The Order Of Alimony Pendente Lite With Landmark Judgements - Free Legal Advice



Being asked by many we are now providing free legal advice on Consequences of disobedience of the order of alimony pendente lite.

The power of the Court of ordering alimony pendente lite in a pending proceeding for matrimonial relief has been provided for, by Section 24, Hindu Marriage Act; Section 36, Indian Divorce Act; Section 36, Special Marriage Act; and Section 39, Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936.

But section 24, Hindu Marriage Act has a peculiar feature. There the relief has been extended to spouse of either sex, that is to say in appropriate case a husband too can claim alimony pendente lite.

There may be situation where the non-applicant refuses to pay the amount of interim maintenance and yet wants to proceed with the case.

In such a case, if the non-applicant is a petitioner, the court has jurisdiction to stay all further proceedings, in the case till he or she pays the amount, and if the non-applicant happens to be respondent, then the court may strike out his or her defence.

As observed in Rayden on Divorce, 11th edition., Pg.700 that for disobedience of an order for payment of alimony a charging order or garnishee may be made; or a judgement summons may issued, or proceedings may be stayed or the decree suspended till payment.

In Anita Karmakar Vs. Birendra Karmakar, AIR 1962 Cal 88. it was held that,  a matrimonial proceedings was stayed at the instance of petitioning spouse till the respondent spouse complied with the lower court'' order of payment of alimony pendente lite.

Such stay due to non-compliance with the order of payment of alimony pendente lite was made in a series of subsequent cases- Bhuneswar Vs. Droplabai, AIR 1963 MP 259, D.V. Shindogi Vs. Saraswatibai, AIR 1969 Mys 16

Also read – Interim Maintenance Of Qualified Wife Under Section 24 of The Hindu Marriage Act,1955 With Landmark Judgements



In A. Susheelamma Vs. Raghunatha Reddy (1977)2 Andh WR 98,  a proceeding for restitution of conjugal rights was allowed to be stayed till the payment of ad interim maintenance and litigation expenses. Despite the fact that such orders were executable, it was held inherent power should be exercised to stay the proceeding.

In Tara Vs. Jaipal 1946 ILR Cal 604 it was held that refusal to pay maintenance according to court's order is held to be a contempt.

In Prithwiraj Vs. Bai shiv Prabhakar Bai, AIR 1960 Bom 315 it was held that court has inherent power to strike off the defense of a party ordered to pay interim maintenance if the refusal be contumacious.

This view found in favour with the H.P. High Court which held when the proceedings were initiated by the wife for obtaining a decree for judicial separation and the respondent husband who was ordered to pay interim maintenance and expenses, deliberately and contumaciously flouts the order, his defence may be struck off by invoking inherent power. - Jal Singh Vs. Khimi Bhiku, AIRb1978 HP 45.

In Anuradha Vs. Santosh 1976 Del 246 ; Devi Vs. Sandhya 1985 Gau 97, Ravi Saran Prasad alias Kishore Vs. Rashmi Singh 2001 All 227. Court took the view that although there is no specific provision of the Hindu Marriage Act, yet the court has power to change the quantam of interim maimmainten at any time during the pendency of the proceedings, if any change of circumstances is shown by any party to the proceedings.

Section 35B Code of Civil Procedure reserves the power of the court to order payment of cost when a party fails to take steps he is required to take on the date of taking steps. Section 35 B C.P.C. has made the payment of cost a condition precedent to further prosecution Section 35B stands as under-

35B. Costs for causing delay.- (1) If, on any date fixed for the hearing of a suit or for taking any step therein, a party to the suit-


(a) fails to take the step which he was required by or under this Code to take on that date, or

(b) obtains an adjournment for taking such step or for producing evidence or on any other ground,

the court may, for reasons to be recorded, make an order requiring such party to pay to the other party such costs, as would, in the opinion of the court, be reasonably sufficient to reimburse the other party in respect of the expenses incurred by him in attending the court on that date, and payment of such costs, on the date next following the date of such order, shall be a condition precedent to the further prosecution of,-

(a) the suit by the plaintiff, where the plaintiff was ordered to pay such costs,

(b) the defence by the defendant, where the defendant was ordered to pay such costs.

Explanation : Where separate defences have been raised by the defendants or groups of defendants, payment of such costs shall be a condition precedent to the further prosecution of the defence by such defendants or groups of defendants as have been ordered by the court to pay such costs.

(2) The costs, ordered to be paid under sub-section (1), shall not, if paid, be included in the costs awarded in the decree passed in the suit; but, if such costs are not paid, a separate order shall be drawn up indicating the amount of such costs and the names and addresses of the persons by whom such costs are payable and the order so drawn up shall be executable against such persons.



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9 Major Differences Between Common Intention And Common Object With Landmark Judgements



To draw distinction between Common intention and Common Object it is essential to understand the meaning of the two terms

Common intention :-  Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code deals with acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. According to it " When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone."

Ingredients :- Click on the following link to read -
Ingredients and principles of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

Also read - Landmark Judgements on Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 

Common object :- Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code provides that If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.

Ingredients :- Click on the following link to read -
Ingredients of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.

Also read - Landmark Judgements on Section 141 and Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. 

9 major differences between common intention and common object are -

1. The basis of liability under section 34 is the existence of common intention animating the accused person.

Liability under section 149 is based on the existence of common object or knowledge of the probability of the commission of the offence i.e., natural consequences as the accused kenw to be likely to be committed.

2. Criminal act under section 34 must be done in furtherance of common intention .

Criminal act under section 149 must be done in prosecution of the common object or it would be sufficient if the members of the unlawful assembly knew that offence was likely to be committed.

3. Some act howsoever small or insignificant must be done by every person accused of the commission of an offence i.e.,active partcipation in commission of crime is necessary for application of section 34 .

Merely being a member of the unlawful assembly at the time of the commission of crime would be sufficient for application of section 149 . Active participation in commission of crime is not necessary .

4. For application of section 34 the offence must be committed by two or more than two persons .

For application of section 149 the offence must be committed by five or more persons because then only they can form an unlawful assembly.

5. Common intention within the meaning of section 34 is undefined and unlimited.

Common object is defined and is limited to the five unlawful objects stated in section 141 of the Code .

6. Under section 34 the individual offender is associated with the criminal act both physically and mentally. He is a sharer both in criminal act and the common intention in furtherance of which the criminal act done .

Under section 149 an individual is punishable only because of his being a member of the unlawful assembly at time of commission of the offence by any member of the unlawful assembly He may not have committed the offence .

7. Section 34 enunciates the principle of joint liability but creates no specific offence. It is of interpretative character.

Section 149 creates specific offence.  It is merely declaratory of the principle of joint liability.

8. Under section 34 the emphasis in respect of the physical act and mental state ( i.e., the state of mind at the time of commission of crime) is divided and is placed both on the group committing the offence as well as upon the individuals constituting that group.

Under section 149 the entire emphasis both in respect of physical act as well as mental state is placed on the unlawful assembly.

9. It was held by the Supreme Court in Nanak Chand vs State of Punjab AIR 1953 SC 274 , that the community of intention required by section 34 is replaced in Section 149 by community of object, which is quite a different element. Common intention presupposes prior concert and meeting of minds , whereas a common object may be formed without that. There may be cases where the object of group is one , but the intention of the participants differ.

References -
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal- THE INDIAN PENAL CODE-33rd Edition
Criminal Law: Cases and Materials - Sixth Edition - K.D.Gaur
Prof. S.N.Misra - INDIAN PENAL CODE- 15th Edition



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Ingredients Of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Every Member Of Unlawful Assembly Guilty Of Offence Committed In Prosecution Of Common Object)



Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code provides that  " If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence. "


Ingredients-  Following are the ingredients of this offence ( i.e., offence committed in prosecution of common object under section 149 of the Indian Penal Code) - 


1. Some offence must be committed by any member of an unlawful assembly; and


2. Such offence must have been committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly; or must be such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed. 


Also read -  9 Major Differences Between Common Intention And Common Object With Landmark Judgements. 


Landmark Judgements on Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. 


Ingredients may be explained as follows


1. Offence committed by members of unlawful assembly-  The Supreme Court in Yunis Vs State of Madhya Pradesh, 2003 Cri. L.J. 817 (S.C.),  held that presence of accused as part of unlawful assembly is sufficient for conviction. The fact that accused was a member of unlawful assembly and his presence at place of occurrence is sufficient to hold him guilty even if no overt act is imputed to him. However mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless he was actuated by common object and that object is one of those set out in Section 141. 


Section 141 provides that - 

An assembly of five or more persons is designated an “unlawful assembly”, if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is -

1. To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the Central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legis¬lature of any State, or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or 


2. To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or


3. To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or 


4. By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or  


5. By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do. Explanation.—An assembly which was not unlawful when it assem¬bled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly. 


2. (A) In prosecution of the common object - " In prosecution of the common object " do not mean " during the prosecution of the common object of the assembly. " The words " in prosecution of the common object " show that the offence committed was immediately connected with the common object of the assembly, of which the accused were members. The act must be such as have been done with a view to accomplish the common object attributed to the members of the unlawful assembly. The words " in prosecution of the common object " have to be strictly construed as equivalent to " in order to attain common object."


(B). Members knew to be likely - The second part relates to a situation where the members of the assembly knew that the offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. A thing is likely to happen only when it will probably happen or may very well happen. The word ' knew ' indicates a state of mind at the time of commission of an offence and not latter. Knowledge must be proved. The word ' likely ' means some clear evidence that the unlawful assembly had such a knowledge. The prosecution must prove that the accused not only knew that the offence was likely to be committed but also that it was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly. 


(C). Five or more persons - For the application of this section is essential to prove that there were at least five persons sharing the common object. The presence of five or more persons must be unquestionably proved although it may happen that some of them are identifiable or that their identity was doubtful. In such cases even less than five persons may be convicted. But if it is doubtful that there were at least five persons no conviction is possible under this section. 



References -

Ratanlal & Dhirajlal- THE INDIAN PENAL CODE-33rd Edition
Criminal Law: Cases and Materials - Sixth Edition - K.D.Gaur
Prof. S.N.Misra - INDIAN PENAL CODE- 15th Edition



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Landmark Judgements On Section 141(Unlawful Assembly) And Section 149 (Every Member Of Unlawful Assembly Guilty Of Offence Committed In Prosecution Of Common Object) Of The Indian Penal Code, 1860




Some landmark judgements on Section 141 ( i.e., unlawful assembly) and Section 149 ( i.e., Every member of Unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 are the following -

In Kartar Singh Vs State of Punjab (1962) 2 S.C.R. 395. the Supreme Court observed that, when the number of assailants is definite and all of them are named and the number of persons found to proved to have taken part in the incident is less than five, then it cannot be held that the assailants party, must have consisted of five or more persons.

The fact that certain persons are named in the charge as composing of an unlawful assembly, excludes the possibility of other persons are to be in the said assembly especially when there is no occasion to think that the witness who named all the accused could have committed mistake in recognizing the assailants. But this does not mean that whenever persons named in the charge are alleged to constitute an unlawful assembly it is legally not permissible to the prosecution to prove during the trial that persons in addition to those named in the charge were also member of the said assembly.

In other words, where persons named in the charge are alleged to constitute an unlawful assembly, the court on facts would be slow to come to the conclusion that persons other than those named in the charge were members of the said assembly. If, however it appears on evidence that persons not so named in the charge were members of unlawful assembly, there is no legal bar which prevents the courts from reaching that conclusion.

In Dharampal Vs State of U.P. AIR 1975 S.C. 1917, the Supreme Court held that if the Court holds that the assailants were actually five in number but there could be doubt as to the identity of two of the alleged assailants and therefore acquits two of them, the others will not get the benefit of doubt about the identity of the two accused so long as there a firm finding based on good evidence and sound reasoning that the participants were five or more in number.

In Bhimrao Vs State of Maharashtra, 2003 Cri.L.J. 1204 (S.C.) the appeallant/accused along with some others formed an unlawful assembly with a common object of committing the murder of Prabhakar Gawande. With that object they went to his house. Some of the members of the unlawful assembly entered the house of Prabhakar and assaulted him causing grievous injuries, consequent to which he died about six days later.

Original common object of the accused persons was only to assault Prabhakar but some of them after entering into his house developed different common object to cause grievous injuries. Accused and some otjoth were only standing outside the house and could not know what transpired inside the house. It was held that the act of those members of original unlawful assembly who entered the house cannot be attributed to the members who stood outside.

Therefore, the appeallants will be liable to be punished for sharing the original common object which was only to assault the deceased. They will be liable to be convicted under section 352 read with section 149 and not under section 326 read with section 149.

In Amerika Rai & Ors. v. State of Bihar  (2011) 4 SCC 677, this Court opined that for a member of unlawful assembly having common object what is liable to be seen is as to whether there was any active participation and the presence of all the accused persons was with an active mind in furtherance of their common object. The law of vicarious liability under Section 149 IPC is crystal clear that even the mere presence in the unlawful assembly, but with an active mind, to achieve the common object makes such a person vicariously liable for the acts of the unlawful assembly.

Regarding the application of Section 149, the following observations from Charan Singh v. State of U.P (2004) 4 SCC 205, are very relevant:

"13. ... The crucial question to determine is whether the assembly consisted of five or more persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more of the common objects, as specified in Section 141. ... The word `object' means the purpose or design and, in order to make it `common', it must be shared by all. In other words, the object should be common to the persons, who compose the assembly, that is to say, they should all be aware of it and concur in it. "

"  A common object may be formed by express agreement after mutual consultation, but that is by no means necessary. It may be formed at any stage by all or a few members of the assembly and the other members may just join and adopt it. Once formed, it need not continue to be the same. It may be modified or altered or abandoned at any stage. "

" The expression `in prosecution of common object' as appearing in Section 149 has to be strictly construed as equivalent to `in order to attain the common object'. It must be immediately connected with the common object by virtue of the nature of the object. There must be community of object and the object may exist only up to a particular stage, and not thereafter...."

In Bhanwar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 16 SCC 657, this Court held:
"Hence, the common object of the unlawful assembly in question depends firstly on whether such object can be classified as one of those described in Section 141 IPC. Secondly, such common object need not be the product of prior concert but, as per established law, may form on the spur of the moment. Finally, the nature of this common object is a question of fact to be determined by considering nature of arms, nature of the assembly, behaviour of the members, etc. ".

Also read - 9 Major Differences Between Common Intention And Common Object. 

Ingredients of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.


References -
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal- THE INDIAN PENAL CODE-33rd Edition
Criminal Law: Cases and Materials - Sixth Edition - K.D.Gaur
Prof. S.N.Misra - INDIAN PENAL CODE- 15th  Edition




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